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JURISDICTION
Section 78-31a-19, Utah Code (1985 Amendment), and Rule
3(a), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, confer upon this Court
jurisdiction to the hear the appeal of Claron Bailey the trial
from the trials court's judgment awarding Bailey $1,800.00 by
virtue of Call's failure to provide a bond as required by former
Section 14-2-1, et seq., Utah Code.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Is there sufficient evidence to support the trial

court's factual finding that the property owner Call did not
confer any authority upon the original supplier which would allow
Bailey to claim the lien interest under the mechanic's lien law?
2.

Is a mechanic's lien filed by Bailey valid against

the owner of real property who did not give authority to the
original supplier to obtain supplies from any other source?
3.

Does the language of the former Utah bond law limit

the judgment to "the price as agreed upon" between the owner and
the original supplier?
4.

Has Bailey waived his right to contest the amount of

the judgment awarded by the trial court?
5.

Did the trial court abuse its' discretion in not

awarding the appellant any attorneys fees?
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APPLICABLE STATUTES & RULES
1.

Mechanic's Liens Statutes.

Utah Code Section 38-1-3.
What may be attached.

Those entitled to lien -

Contractors, subcontractors and al|L persons performing
any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment
used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner
and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have
furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings,
estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have
rendered shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning
which they have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished
or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service
tendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished or
rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner
or of any other person acting by his authority as agent,
contractor, or otherwise. This lien shall attach only to such
interest as the owner may have in the property.
Utah Code Section 38-1-17. Cost -» Apportionment Costs and attorneys' fee to subcontractor.
As between the owner and the contractor the court shall
apportion the costs according to the right of the case, but in all
cases each subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall have his costs
awarded to him, including the costs of preparing and recording the
notice of claim of lien and such reasonable attorney's fee as may
be incurred in preparing and recording said notice of claim of
lien.
Utah Code Section 38-1-18.

Attorneys' fee.

In any action brought to enforce any lien under this
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall
be taxed as costs in the action.
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2.

Bond Law Statutes.

Utah Code Section 14-2-2 (former statute, prior to 1987
revision). Failure to require bond — Direct liability —
Limitation of actions.
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who
shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit
the same, as herein required, shall be personally liable to all
persons who have furnished materials or performed labor under the
contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished or
labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices
agreed upon. Actions to recover on such liability shall be
commenced within one year from the last date the last materials
were furnished or the labor performed.
3.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 52(a). Findings by the court.
Effect.
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injuctions the court shall similarly set forth the
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary
for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them,
shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of
the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision
filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided
in Rule 4 K b ) . The court shall, however, issue a brief written
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is
based on more than one ground.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Claron Bailey, the plaintiff/appellant, brought this action
in Salt Lake Fifth Circuit Court to foreclose a mechanic's lien he
had filed against the property owned by the defendants/respondents, William G. Call and Gene S. Call, his wife.

The plaintiff

brought this action against Mr. and Mrs. Call, who are the title
owners of the property, although Mr. Call was the only one who had
any material conversation or dealings relevant to this matter.
Bailey had supplied material used in the repair of a commercial
building owned by the Calls. Mr. Call had contracted with a
LeRoy Gurule to supply the materials from Gurule's own warehouse.
Thereafter Gurule, without Call's knowledge, obtained the
materials from Bailey.
After two days of trial (separated by several weeks due
do to the trial court's calendar), judgment was granted in favor
of Bailey.

The trial court applied the Ut^h bond laws in granting

judgment, and not the mechanic's liens laws.

The judgment was not

prepared by plaintiff's counsel and entered in the court records
for more than one year after the trial court announced its
findings and conclusions.

Bailey seeks to appeal the trial court's

judgment as inadequate, as insufficiently ^supported by evidence and
as inappropriately applying the bond law instead of the mechanic's
lien law.
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Statement of Facts
In April 1985 Mr. Call had a conversation with a
customer in his store about ceiling repairs that were necessary
because of heavy snow fall the previous winter.

The customer,

LeRoy Gurule (spelled Gurle by the reporter in the record)
represented to Mr. Call that he was in the construction business
and that he could provide all the supplies needed by Call in
making the needed repairs. Call became more interested when
Gurule represented that he bought materials by the truckload
direct from the manufacturer and could supply materials at a
favorable price.

Accordingly, Gurule was commissioned to supply

the material from his own supply located in his own warehouses.
(Record 348-351).
Mr. Call had hired another contractor to perform the
labor, although Gurule's son was hired at Gurule's request to
assist in the work (R. 349, 180, 335). Unbeknownst to Call, Gurule
contacted Claron Bailey, also a supplier of the necessary
material, to arrange delivery of the needed material to Call's
store (R. 352, 224-225).

The material was delivered from Bailey's

warehouse to the jobsite by two individuals, Mr. Bailey's brother
and Gurule's son (R. 175, 182; Exhibits P-l, P-2, P-3, P-5 to
P-8, P-10).

Mr. Call testified that he did not know the source of

these materials was Mr. Bailey until after the last delivery on
May 21, 1985. Mr. Call stated that between the date of the last
delivery and the date the mechanic's lien was filed, May 31, 1985,
he had a telephone conversation with Mr. Bailey, (R. 351-352).
5

Although there is conflicting evidence as tp whether or not this
conversation ocurred before or after the la$t delivery, Mr. Bailey
admitted that neither he nor anyone at his direction contacted Mr.
Call prior to the first shipment of material (R. 223). It should
be pointed out that the trial judge evidently believed plaintiff's
testimony as reflected in paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 of the trial
court's Findings of Fact (R. 371-372, see also the addendum).
Some of the material supplied by Bailey was returned to
Bailey by Teddy Gurule, for credit (R. 195). There is also
testimony that some of the materials apparently delivered to the
jobsite were not used in the job (R. 193, $ee also Exhibits P-6
and P-12).
The last material supplied by Bailey was delivered to
Call's buiding on May 21, 1985, and the mechanic's lien was signed
by plaintiff and filed on May 31, 1985 (Exhibits P.3 and P.14).
The lien claimed the sum of $3,435.17, together with interest due
thereon.

There was no agreement by Call as to the amount of

interest to accrue.

The complaint filed by Bailey sought damages

in the amount of $3,435.17, together with interest.

At trial

plaintiff's bookkeeper admitted that the amount stated in the lien
was incorrect (R. 170). Call refused to make payment to Bailey,
having paid Gurule at least $2,000 and perhaps $2,200 (R. 201,
352).

Trial followed.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Trial produced sufficient evidence which showed that

Call had not authorized Gurule to purchase materials from anyone
else, including Bailey.

Therefore, the trial court's findings of

fact on this issue are beyond reproof.
2.

The mechanic's lien law is limited to labor and

supplies provided for the property with the owner's knowledge and
consent.

Since Gurule had no authority to obtain supplies from

Bailey, the trial court properly concluded that recovery under the
mechanic's lien law was not available to Bailey.
3.

The former bond law provision applicable to Call's

construction required the trial court to award less than the
reasonable value of the materials because Call had agreed with
Gurule on a lesser amount.
4.

The $1,800.00 judgment amount was not raised by

Bailey in the trial court and thus cannot be considered for the
first time on appeal.

In any event, the evidence and the law

supports an award of less than the amount agreed to by Call.
5.

The trial court's exercise of discretion in

determining the equities of Bailey's claim for attorney's fees was
proper.

And since Bailey has pursued a frivolous appeal on issues

well settled, Call should be awarded his attorney's fees
necessitated by Bailey's appeal.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT GURULE DID NOT HAVE
AUTHORITY TO OBTAIN THE SUPPLIES FROM BAILEY
Bailey suggests this court disregard the trial courtfs
Findings of Fact relative to Gurule's lack of authority to order
materials from Bailey.

Bailey suggests that it is Mr. Call's

testimony alone which supports paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 of the
trial courts Findings of Fact, yet by that suggestion, Bailey
concedes that there is evidence to support the trial court's
findings.

The standard of review in this situation is set forth

in the January 1, 1987, amendment to Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure which deals with findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by a trial court in a non-jury proceeding.
See also Porter v. Groover, 734 P.2d 464 (Utah, 1987).

Rule 52(a)

provides, in part:
. . . Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erronous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses. . . .
The following excerpt from Mr. Call's testimony
illustrates Mr. Call's understanding with Gurule:
Q: Did Mr. Gurle [sic] make any statements to you about
where he was going to get his material, other than the one you —
the statement you already described?
A: Well, he said he supplied all his own. He brought it
in by the truckload and he — that's — and he warehouses it here.
Q: Did he ever —
A: He represented himself as a big contractor.
Q: Did he ever tell you that hi$ — any of this material
would be supplied locally?
8

A: No. Absolutely not.
Q: Did you give him any authority to purchase any
material locally?
A:

No. (R. 351).

Mr. Call had testified earlier that he contracted with
Gurule only to provide the materials, and that he had contracted
with another to provide the labor (R. 199, 349). However, Mr.
Gurule's son did assist in some of the labor to install the
sheetrock and Mr. Gurule himself physically assisted the work on
one occasion (R. 192).
Appellant's brief also fixes upon the testimony of one of
the workers that Call hired to work on the ceiling to support the
notion that Call knew that the materials came from Bailey's
warehouse.

However, the witness (Clarey Haulk) testified that it

"was in May, sometime" when he learned the supplier was Claron
Bailey (R. 336). This could easily have been between May 21 and
May 31, when Mr. Call himself found out the supplier was Claron
Bailey.

In is interesting to note that Teddy Gurule, LeRoy's son,

was called by Bailey as a rebuttal witness.

In his testimony on

rebuttal, young Mr. Gurule testified that Mr. Haulk hauled away
some of the materials, presumably for his own personal use (R. 361).
Undoubtedly this may have had a damaging effect on Mr. Haulk's
credibility in certain matters, a factor which is of course the
trial court's sole province to determine.
It is perhaps most significant that the appellant's own
witnesses failed to establish any knowledge on Mr. Call's behalf
that the materials had been supplied by Bailey prior to their
delivery.

As noted in the statement of facts, there is some
9

disputed evidence on this point, but even so it remains clear that
no one on behalf of Mr. Bailey ever had any contact with Mr. Call
or his wife prior to the first delivery of the subject supplies.
There is, therefore, no overwhelming contrary evidence that the
agreement between Mr. Call and Roy Gurule was anything other than
that stated by Mr. Call, nor is there any overwhelming evidence
that Mr. Call knew of the source of the supplies until after they
had been delivered and installed in his building.

Thus, the trial

court's finding that LeRoy Gurule did not have the authority to
purchase materials for Mr. Call from Mr. Bailey is a finding of
fact that is well within the trial court's discretion to make.

II.
BAILEY CANNOT RECOVER AGAINST CALL UNDER
THE MECHANIC'S LIEN LAW BECAUSE GURULE WAS
NOT ACTING WITH CALL'S AUTHORITY
Appellant's brief next challenge is to the trial court's
conclusion that since Mr. Gurule had no authority to obtain
materials from Bailey, Bailey cannot maintain a claim under the
mechanic's lien law for the value of the material so supplied.
In support of his position urging this court to hold that
the mechanic's lien law will presume agency under any
circumstance, the appellant's brief cites Interiors Contracting,
Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382 (Utah, 1982).

In Navalco, the

lessee (Green Acres) had leased the property from the owner
(Navalco) and sublet a portion of the building to the sub-lessee
(Hungry Hawaiian).

In approving the sub-lease, Navalco had given
10

its approval for alterations necessary for the Hungry Hawaiian to
commence restaurant operations.

The subcontractors hired to make

the necessary modifications did not receive full payment for their
labor and materials and both filed a notice of lien on the building,
which included claims against the sub-lessee, the lessee and the
owner.
The Supreme Court reversed summary judgment in favor of
the lessee and sub-lessee, but with respect to the judgment
entered against the owner, the court reversed that judgment with
the following analysis:
As to the argument that Navalco authorized
the improvements by a letter of acceptance,
which was signed by Navalco January 31, 1978, we
are of the view that the acceptance amounted to
no more than its consent that the alterations be
made.
The record shows no more than Navalco's
knowledge of and acquiescence in the making of
the improvements by Hungry Hawaiian.
Navalco's
knowledge and acquiescence in the making of the
improvements is not sufficient to charge the fee
owner's interest with a mechanic's lien, see
Zion's First National Bank v. Carlson,
23 Utah
2.d 395, 464 P.2 387 (1970), especially since
Navalco was a remote lessor and the master lease
between
Navalco and Green Acres
did
not
contemplate that the premises were to be used as
a restaurant.
Therefore, the judgment against
Navalco, was the exception of the $582.00 [for
work done after Navalco expressly authorized one
of the claimants to finish certain work], must
be reversed. 648 P.2d, at 1390 (other citations
omitted).
The effect of this reasoning is directly contrary to
Bailey's position.
court to this case.

Such is the reasoning applied by the trial
The owner William Call had absolutely no

knowledge that Bailey was supplying the materials until after they
had been supplied and a portion used in his building, directly
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contrary to Call's understanding with Gurul^. Thus Call cannot be
charged with a claim under the mechanic's lien statute by virtue of
Mr. Gurule's total lack of authority to order material from
Bailey, and Call's lack of knowledge as to the source of the
material.
The supreme court's holding in Navalco is also directly
contrary to the Massachusetts case cited in appellant's brief,
Viccory v. Richardson, 75 N.E. 136 (Mass., 1905).

Thus, this case

is impersuasive and has no application to the present situation.
Bailey also cites Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2nd 422, 424
P.2d 446 (1976), in support of his position.

However, in Frehner

the defendant owner not only knew of the plaintiff architect's
involvement in landscaping the subject property, the defendant
owner gave his express permission to his daughter to continue
using the plaintiff architect.

Thus, the supreme court concluded:

. . . These facts provide a reasonable basis for
the conclusions that the daughter, Margaret, was
authorized by the defendants to engage the
plaintiff to do the landscaping; that it was
done with the defendants' knowledge; and that,
therefore, under the statute their interest in
the property was liable for the improvement thus
conferred upon it. 424 p.2d, at 447.
Again, in comparing the facts and holding in Frehner to
the instant case, the defendant owners in Frehner were held liable
because they knew and authorized the involvement of the lien
claimant.

In McCombs Construction, Inc., v. Barnes 645 P.2d 1131

(Wash. App., 1982),Frehner v. Morton, supra, was cited by the lien
claimant in an action against the owners of a home who had allowed
their son to live in the home.

The son had directed certain
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modifications be made to the home without the parents prior
knowledge or approval.

Although the parents visited the home

during construction and knew of the construction, the Washington
Court of Appeals rejected the argument that Frehner v. Morton was
applicable.

The court held that statutory agency under the

Washington statutory scheme was inappropriate because:
. Although contractors, subcontractors and
architects have the authority to incur an indebtness which may result in the attachment of a
lien on the owner's property, this authority may
arise only wherethe owner has given it to them.
645 P.2 at 1134.
Such an analysis is consistent with the Utah Supreme
Court decision in Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, supra.
Appellant's brief also cites Metals Manufacturing Co.
v. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2.d 74, 395 P.2d 914 (1964), a case
cited in Navalco.
reasons.

This case offers no comfort to Bailey for two

First, the property owner was not involved in the claim

or the litigation.

Second, the defendant lessee bank knew in

advance the contractor obtained certain specific material from a
supplier.
of
had

The supreme court held that the intention and knowledge

the parties properly resulted in a valid bond claim (the
failed

to

obtain a bond under the

statute

relevant

bank
here)

against the bank.
Bailey argues that because it is customary for suppliers
to rely on the representations of those who order material,
such reliance can ignore the authority of those persons who order
the materials in making lien claims. Bailey's brief alleges that
such is the customary course of business dealings between
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contractors and suppliers.

There was no evidence presented to the

trial court to support itr but even assuming that such a course of
dealing is customary, the custom cannot overcome the doctrine of
express and apparent authority.

Bailey testified that he solely

relied upon the representations of Gurule ifl delivering the
material to Call's building and that he did not know whether Call
was aware of where the materials were coming from (R. 226, 227).
Thus, Bailey argues that because it is customary for him to do
so, he has no duty to make any determination that the potential
lien defendant knows who the potential lien claimants could be.
Such a carte blanche interpretation of the Mechanic's lien statutue
is totally inappropriate and totally ignore|s the language of the
legislature which specifically requires an owner or an agent of
the owner, having proper authority, to agree to the supply of
materials or labor.
The appellant's argued interpretation of the mechanic's
lien statute would lead to liens being fil^d in the most extreme
of circumstances, such as where an owner of property gives his
consent to a contractor to install carpeting that turns out to be
stolen from a supplier.

If the contractor had represented to the

owner that he already owned the carpet, Barley's interpretation of
the mechanic's lien law would nontheless permit the supplier to
file a lien against the owner's home. The law governing agents
and their authority must be given more thafi lip service in an
interpretation of the mechanic's lien statute.
Bailey also argues that by agreeing to have the work done
in the first place, Call made Gurule his authority to obtain
14

materials from anyone.

The cited reasoning is Interiors Contracting,

Inc. v. Navalcp/ supra, suggests otherwise.

It is hornbook law

that the existence of apparent authority hinges upon the conduct
of the principal.

Apparent authority has been defined as "that

which, though not actually granted, the principal knowingly
permits the agent to exercise or which he holds him out as possessing."

Thus, the basis of an agent's apparent authority:
. . results from statements, conduct, lack of
ordinary care, or manifestation of the principal
consent, whereby third persons are justified in
believing that the agent is acting within his
authority. 3 Am Jur 2.nd, Agency, Section 74, p.
476.
In Roby's Enterprises, Inc. v. Hanover Development Corp.,

679 P.2d 871 (Ore.App., 1984), the Oregon Court of Appeals
addressed, inter alia, a similar agency issue.

In that case the

contractor's construction superintendant had hired the lien
claimant to effect floor repairs.

In setting aside summary

judgment against the contractor, the appeals court noted that
affidavits submitted by the contractor (Douglas) indicated that
the superintendant (Olson) did not have authority to hire the lien
claimant.

The court concluded:

Although there is no dispute that Olson
was Douglas1 agent on the project, a principal
cannot be held liable for the acts of its agent
unless the acts are within the scope of the
agents real or apparent authority. 679 P.2d, at
874 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the case was sent back for trial on that
issue, among others.
By Bailey's own admission, Gurule did nothing other than

15

misrepresent that he had Call's authority to order the material.
Bailey cannot claim Gurule had apparent authority when Bailey had
not talked to Mr. Call until after the material had been supplied.
The trial court thus properly concluded that because
Gurule had no authority, express, implied or apparent, to order
materials from Bailey,
Bailey

and because Call didn't know their source,

cannot recover against Call under the Utah mechanic's lien

statute which requires such authority.
III.
THE AMOUNT AWARDED BAILEY COMPLIED WITH THE
FORMER UTAH BOND LAW AND WAS PROPER IN THAT IT
DID NOT EXCEED THE PRICE AS AGREED UPON BY CALL
Because Call failed to obtain a bond under the Utah bond law
and because the bond law makes no reference to agents with or
without authority, the trial court applied the bond law statute
in awarding Bailey judgment against Call.

Bailey complains that

the amount of the judgment is not the reasonable value of the
material he supplied, but, is the price agreed upon by Gurule and
Call.
In comparing the bond and lien statutues, the language used
with regard to the amount which can be claimed by a lien claimant
in Section 14-2-2, is obviously different than the amount which
can be awarded a lien claimant in Section 38-1-3.

The mechanic's

lien law refers to the "value of the material or labor furnished"
and is not limited by the language "not exceeding, however, in
any case the prices agreed upon," contained in former Section 14-2-2.
It would seem logical that the "prices agreed upon" by Call, the

16

owner, is the price that governs since he is the one who agreed
to have the work done in the first place.

Further, Bailey cannot

escape the logic that since the trial court found there was no
expressf apparent or implied authority for Gurule to obtain
material from Bailey, as the lien statute requires, Gurule had no
authority to agree upon a price which would be binding upon Call.
It is noteworthy that in its 1987 session, the Utah legislature
rewrote Section 14-2-2 to remove the limitation and made it easier
for persons in Bailey's position to claim "reasonable value". But
this amendment of course does not apply to the present case.
Bailey cites the need for suppliers to recover their
profits which would give him judgment for the amount denied him under
the mechanic's lien statute.

It makes no sense to misinterpret the

clear language of the former bond law and allow Bailey to get through
the back door what he couldn't get through the front door, particularly since he took absolutely no precautions to determine the extent
of Gurule's authority before shipping materials for Gurule.

While

the new Section 14-2-2 renders Bailey's policy arguments moot, it
would not have hindered commerce between contractors, laborers,
suppliers and owners in this state one bit for suppliers and
laborers to make sure that potential lien defendants know who the
potential lien claimants are, particularly when the suppliers and
laborers have the knowledge to do so, whereas the owners do not.
If suppliers failed in this duty, then under the mechanic's lien
laws they were limited to claims under the former bond law, which
may have deprived them of their profit but still gave them some
measure of protection. Since the legislature has conformed the
17

language of Section 14-2-2 to Section 38-1-3, they apparently were
of a similar frame of mind as Bailey.

But since the law doesn't

affect earlier contracts, this Court must ^pply the old law,
IV.
THE AWARD BY THE TRIAL COURT IN THE AMOUNT
$1,800.00 WAS PROPER AND BEYOND ATTACK
In considering the amount of the trial court's award,
two factors are initially important.
First, although trial was concluded on May 16, 1986, and
the court announced it's findings and conclusions on that day, the
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law a^id the Judgment were not
entered for nearly one year, on April 29, 1987.
Second, during that interim period Bailey filed a motion
for amendment of judgment or new trial on May 27, 1986. The
motion is silent as to the amount awarded by the trial court (R.
70-73).

Bailey's motion was denied, following argument before the

court, on September 8, 1986, (R. 97, 98). Bailey's counsel
submitted proposed findings and a judgment in November 1986, and
counsel exchanged correspondence as to the sufficiency of the
proposed document.

In February 1987, Bailey's counsel again sub-

mitted to counsel a proposed set of findings and a judgment.
Respondent's counsel notified appellant's counsel that the
proposed findings and judgment of February 1987, were insufficient
and notified the court in the event such proposed documents were
submitted for the courts signature that counsel intended to object
(R. 102).

Bailey's counsel noticed a hearing before the trial

court which was eventually heard on April 29, 1987. At the time
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the court heard arguments, counsel finally agreed on the form
of Findings and Judgment/ which were then submitted to the court
for it's signature.

In none of these exchanges and hearings was

the amount awarded by the trial court raised as an issue.

Perhaps

because Bailey filed a motion to amend the judgment or for a new
trial before Findings and the Judgment were entered, this delayed
the entry of the actual Findings, conclusions and the Judgment.
In addition, the inordinate delay may have created some difficulty
in attempting to precisely set forth the courts ruling from the
bench on May 16, 1986.
These circumstances however, do not excuse Bailey from
his obligation, pursuant to Rule 59(b), U.R.C.P. to move for a new
trial or amendment under Rule 59(e) within ten (10) days after
entry of the judgment.

No such motions were filed between April

29, 1987, and May 11, 1987, the date the ten days would have
elapsed.

Nor is Bailey excused from filing a motion for relief

from judgment or bringing an independent action pursuant to
Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P.

The time period for such motions would have

expired on July 29, 1987. Having not raised the issue in the
trial court, Bailey is precluded from raising the issue
upon appeal, e.g. Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P.2d 734 (Utah, 1985).
In the event this court is inclined to entertain the
merits of such a motion, it must be kept firmly in mind that there
was a variety of conflicting evidence presented to the trial court
as to exactly how much material supplied by Bailey was used in the
modifications to Call's building.
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For example, Teddy Gurule admitted he returned items for
credit to Capitol Builders Supply (R. 115). Bailey's bookkeeper
admitted this amounted to a $159.73 credit (R. 138). The
bookkeeper then testified that there was an additional credit for
materials returned (R. 139-140, see also Exhibit P-17).

Further,

Teddy Gurule stated during rebuttal testimony that Clarey Haulk
took some of the material for his own personal use (R. 361).
Teddy Gurule also admitted that of the 12 sheets of sheetrock
delivered to the jobsite, only half were u3ed in the ceiling
repair (R. 193).
Certainly, it was within the sound discretion of the
trial court to take into account the value of these materials that
were taken, returned for credit, or unused* in awarding Bailey
damages.

The wording of the former bond liw statute seems to

grant the trial court this discretion.
V,
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO AWARD PLAINTIFF'S
ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS PROPER
The appellant seeks to have this bourt award Bailey
attorney's fees, not only for the trial but for this appeal,
despite the trial court's refusal to award Bailey attorney's fees.
One of the issues addressed in Frtehner v. Morton, supra,
dealt with the discretion of the trial court to award attorney's
fees in such cases.

In Frehner, a jury awarded the plaintiff $750

in attorney's fees.

The court reduced the attorney's fees to one-
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half of the total amount covered by the lien.

The plaintiff's

cross-appealed and asked the Utah Supreme Court to reinstate the
original fee determined by the jury.

After noting that the deter-

mination of attorney's fees in a mechanic's lien case is a
question of equity, the court summarily ruled against the
plaintiffs:
We,
therefore, dismiss the plaintiffs'
cross appeal
as being without merit,
even
assuming that they are entitled to a lien.
If
they are not entitled to a lien, they would not
be entitled to an attorney's fee even though one
or more of the defendants might be liable for
the value of the work done.424 P.2d 446, at 448.
Thus the supreme court refused to disturb the trial judge's
exercise of discretion in balancing the equities to make a
determination of attorney's fees.
Given the trial court's finding that Gurule had no
authority to bind Call in the purchase of material from Bailey,
and in light of the reduced amount awarded Bailey pursuant to the
bond lien law, it was well within the trial court's discretion to
refuse to award plaintiff any attorney's fees.

That equitable

finding should remain undisturbed.
On the other hand, in the event this court affirms the
trial court's judgment, Call should be awarded his reasonable
attorney's fees incurred in defending the trial court's judgment.
As demonstrated herein, the trial court had ample evidence to
support its findings of fact.

The conclusion of law determining

that Bailey was not entitled to a judgment under the mechanic's
lien statute is well supported by case law.

Bailey's appeal would

therefore appear to be frivolous, particularly considering the
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amounts involved.

Call has been required tb retain counsel

further to defend this appeal and it is likely that those
attorney's fees will amount to more than the difference between
the trial court's judgment and the amount Bailey is seeking.
Thus, Call will incur an actual out-of-pocket loss in excess of
the amount claimed by Bailey.

To impose such an economic result

upon Call by virtue of this frivolous appeal should not go without
some effort by this court to balance the equities.

This court

has the authority to do so by virtue of Ru][e 33, Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals.
CONCLUSION
Ample evidence supports the trial court's finding that
LeRoy Gurule was not authorized, either apparently, impliably or
expressly, by the respondent William Call to purchase material from
the appellant Claron Bailey.

The trial court's conclusion that

such evidence therefore deprives Bailey of a mechanic's lien claim
is well supported by the law.

The amount awarded by the trial

court is proper pursuant to statute and the $1,800 award itself
has not been challenged properly by the appellant.

The respond-

ents respectively urge the court to affirm the trial court's
judgment and to award the respondents their reasonable attorney's
fees incurred as a result of Bailey's appeal.
DATED this ^

day of December, 1987.

f. CALL,
>rney for Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed this

day of

December, 1987 to:
Steven F. Alder
Attorney for Appellant
220 East 3900 South, #16
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
^#<^
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Sfteven F. Alder, #33
Attorney for Plaintiff
220 S. 3900 S., Suite 16
S.L.C., UT 84107
Telephone:
262-2500

FEB 2 ? 1981

FILED
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE Of.4H?TAH- fj-p^oricMT'"

SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
CLARON D. BAILEY,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
WILLIAM G. CALL and GENE S.
CALL,

Civil No.

85-QV-10254

Defendants.
)

The foregoing matter, having come on for;crial before the
Honorable Michael Hutchings on the ££~
£^

1986, and subsequently on the

^

aw J

Llrgi — —

i-Ttagp

/£>

day

d^y of

f^j/r-^iAictAM

Ma ±
•~~, 1986, plaintiff

being present and represented by counsel Steven F. Alder,
defendant VJilliam G. Call being present and (represented by counsel
John W% Call.

The court having heard evidence and argument of

counsel;
NOV? THEREFORE THE COURT ENTERS THE FOLLOWING JUDGMENT:
1.

The plaintiff Claron D. Bailey is granted judgment on the

Second Cause of Action (Bond Claim) against the defendants William
G. Call and Gene S. Call, in the sum of One Thousand Eight Hundred
Dollars ($1800.00) together v/ith costs and Interest on that amount

-2-

at 10% per annum from the date of delivery of the goods until the c**£s c/faentry of judgment and at 12% per annum tke^eafter^Zt -c*v^»
2.

^Su^U****-^.

The defendants First Cause of Action seeking foreclosure

of lien is dismissed with prejudice.
3.

\

No attorney's fees are av;arded in this action to either
I

party.
DATED this

day of

, 1987.
BY/ THE gOURT.V^:

Fudge Mi£hae~j
Circuit- Court.. Jti4We
Approved by:

0*Y

John VI. Call
Attorney for Defendant

v ^

FEB z 7 mi
Steven F. Alder, #33
Attorney for Plaintiff
220 E. 3900 S., Suite 16
S.L.C., UT 84107
Telephone: 262-2500
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTArf^V|\^»;';-V.,,;Vi
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
CLARON D. BAILEY,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS 07 LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM G. CALL and GENS S,
CALL f

Civil Nq./ 85-CV-10254

Defendants.
)

The foregoing matter, having come on (f:or trial before the
day of &P**+y ***f lb

Honorable Michael Hutchings on the <^5~

^ ^

1986, plaintiff being present and represented by counsel Steven F.
Alder, defendant William G. Call being present and represented by
counsel John V7. Call.

The defendant Gene S. Call was served but

not present was represented by John W. Call $nd bound by the
proceedings by stipulation of counsel.

The <fcourt having heard

evidence and argument of counsel;
NOV? THEREFORE makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The defendants William G. Call and G|ene S. Call are the

owners of real property in Salt Lake County, ^tate of Utah which
is described as follows:

1J
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PARCEL NO. 1:
BEGINNING at the Southeast corner of Lot 4,
SOUTHGATE PARK SUBDIVISION and running thence
North 0°01f West 134.29 feet to the point of
beginning, and running thence West 83 feet;
thence North 0°01f East 31.55 feet; thence East
83 feet; thence South 21.55 feet to the point
of beginning.
PARCEL NO. 2:
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of Lot 248,
SOUTHGATE PARK SUBDIVISION, and running thence
South 0°01f West 71.8 feet; thence West 83
feet; thence North 0°1' East 71.8 feet; thence
East 83 feet to the point of beginning.
2.

The plaintiff is doing business in Salt Lake County as a

supplier of drywall materials.
3.

The subject matter of this action included the foreclosure

of a lien against the above-described property and therefore, this
court has proper jurisdiction of the subject matter of this
dispute.
4.

While the defendants were owners of the above-described

property, they entered into a contract with a Mr. Roy Gurule for
the construction of certain improvements upon the above-described
real property.

The improvements included:

a) the placement of sheetrock over damaged portions of
the ceiling;
b) the hanging of a suspended grid ceiling and the
placement of the ceiling tiles within the grid;
c)

the suspension and placement of fluorescent light

panels within the grids.
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5.

On or about the 26th of April, 1985, the plaintiff was

contacted by Mr. Roy Gurule and agreed to sell to Mr. Roy Gurule
certain materials, including the following:

6.

a)

sheetrock

b)

sheetrock mud

c)

suspended ceiling grid and tiles

d)

lighting panels.

The materials purchased by Mr. Roy Guifule from the

plaintiff were identified by Mr.Gurule or his agents as being
purchased for the improvement of the defendants1 property.
7.

The agreement between the plaintiff aijid Mr. Gurule

provided that the plaintiff would receive payment for these
materials within thirty days of delivery.
8.

The plaintiff pursuant to said agreement did provide

materials to Mr. Roy Gurule which were delivered to the
defendant's address or picked up by Mr. Gurul^ from the plaintiff.
9.

All materials purchased except some items returned for

credit were installed in the real property owped by the
defendants.
10.

Materials were supplied commencing o|n the 26th day of

April, 1985 and continuing until the 21st day of May, 1985.
11.

The reasonable and fair market valuq of the materials

sold to Mr. Gurule and installed as improvements to the real
property less credits for items returned was the sum of $3,327.00.
12.

Mr. Roy Gurule failed to make payments on his account to

the plaintiff despite demands by the plaintiff that he do so.

-4-

13.

Plaintiff made demand for payment upon the defendants and

the defendants have failed to make payment to the plaintiff
against the amount owing for materials purchased.
14.

On June 7, 1985, the plaintiff caused to be recorded a

Notice of Lien against the above-described real property as Entry
No. 4096078 at Book 5661, Page 575, at the offices of the Salt
Lake County Recorder.
15.

Said Notice of Lien was filed in compliance with the

provisions and requirements of §38-1-7 et seq. U.CA. as amended.
16.

A copy of said Notice'of Lien was mailed by certified

mail to the defendants V7illiam G. Call and Gene S. Call at 2157
East 7050 South, Salt Lake City, Utah within thirty days of the
recording of the lien.
17.

The lien was properly signed and notarized and otherwise

complied in form with the statutory requirements to claim a lien
for improvements to real property.

The lien was not compromised

or satisfied and no other action was pending to foreclose said
lien against the real property.

The plaintiff retained counsel

for purposes of bringing this action and foreclosing its lien
rights against the real property.
18.

The contractor's son, together with the contractor, did

provide services at the defendants' property specifically as
follows:

the contractor's son placed sheetrock over damagedarea

in the roof of the building and the contractor assisted in the
loading and stacking of materials at the defendants' building.
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19.

The materials supplied by the plaintiff to the

defendants' building were either picked up by the contractor from
the plaintiff's business or were delivered to the defendants'
property by a third party supplier.
20.

The contractor identified the materials purchased as

being for the defendants' business property aiid invoices were
marked with that identification.
21.

All charges by the contractor (Gurul^) for the job so

identified were separately accounted for by tjie plaintiff.
22.

The contractor, Roy Gurule, at the time of the initial

agreement with the defendants verbally represented to the
defendant William Call that he was a very larjge contractor and
could obtain the materials for improvements a|t a low cost because
of the large volume of his construction activities.
23.

The defendant William Call reasonably implied from the

foregoing representations that the contractor would obtain the
materials from his ov/n stock or his own warehouse and v/ould not be
purchasing them from a third party.

The defendant did not know \

that the plaintiff had supplied the subject Materials until after \
they had been supplied and the work complete^.
The plaintiff was not notified by the defendant or the '
or t>y
contractor either verbally or in writing/ thei actions of either
24.

party that the defendant had represented to the ov/ner that he had
not purchased these materials but had them iln his ov/n stock.

I
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25.

The defendants never contacted the plaintiff prior to

thesupplying of materials nor did the plaintiff contact the
defendants prior to the time that materials had been supplied to
the property, although the plaintiff had knov/n the defendants were
the recipients of the supplies and knew the address where such
supplies were delivered.
26.

The defendants William G. Call and Gene S. Call failed to

provide a bond for the improvements as required by §14-2-1 et seq.
U.C.A. as amended.
27.

The value of the improvements exceeded $2f000.00.

28.

The contractor represented to the defendants that he

would provide the materials and improvements for a total price of
$1,800.00.

Said amount was the agreed price between the

defendants and their contractor Roy Gurule for the materials and
labor supplied.
29.

Contractor further agreed with the defendants to accept a

reupholstering of certain furniture as partial payment for the
materials.

This couch was later sold by the defendant to cover

the costs of recoverying it.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The plaintiff properly filed its Notice of Lien in

conformance with the requirements of Utah Code §38-1-7 et seq. as
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amended and properly gave notice by certified mail to the
defendants within thirty days of the filing thereof.
2.

The authority of defendants contractor was verbally

limited so as to preclude the defendant from obtaining materials
from outside of his own warehouse.

As a result of such verbal

limitation, the contractor was without authority to act as the
owner's agent in purchasing materials for improvements to
defendants' property.
3.

By virtue of the defendants' lack of agency with the owner

because of the verbal limitation on the agency of the contractor,
the defendants are not entitled to foreclose their lien and are
precluded from recovering attorney's fees in this action as
related to the lien foreclosure.
4.

The reasonable value of all labor and materials delivered

to the defendants' property and installed as improvements upon the
property less all proper offsets and credits is the sum of
$3f327.90 plus interest.
5.

The defendants failed to obtain a bond as required by the

provisions of §14-2-1 et seq. U.C.A. as amended.

The provisions

of Paragraph 2.2 provide that any persons subject to the
provisions of the chapter who shall fail to obtain a good and
sufficient bond or to exhibit the same as herein required shall be
personally liable to all persons who have furnished materials or
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performed labor under the contract for the reasonable value of
such materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding however
in any case the price agreed upon.
6.

The contract between the defendants and the contractor

called for the contractor to supply labor and- materials in the sum
of $1,800.00. The verbal contract between the defendants and the
contractor called for the contractor's supply of labor and
materials in the sum of $1800, although the contract between the
contractor and his supplier called for a purchase price of $3,327.
7.

By failure of the defendants to obtain a bond for the

improvements, they are liable/for the value of said improvements
not to exceed the amount of the contract price between themselves
and their contractor; to wit, $1,800.00 plus interest.
8.

The plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the

defendants in the sum of $1,800.00, together with its costs and
interest from the date the materials were supplied until date of
judgment at 10% per annum and from the date of judgment until paid
/[\

at 12% per annum^ _
DATED this

day of

f
, '••VV^Wf 1987.

<<>$&" m:^-

U<3h
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Approved by:

W. Call
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the Sttf^ day of Qi/^^^^J
1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to John W. Call, Attorney for
Defendants, Henriksen, Henriksen & Call, 320 South 500 East,
S.L.C., UT 84102.
^nC/Wto^hTl/isiZfiHetT^,

